George W. Bush and Tony Blair in 2001 (BBC)

David Manning, former British Prime Minister and Tony Blair's chief foreign advisor, wrote a secret memo about the meeting between Tony Blair and former US President George W. Bush in Texas in April 2002.

Blair visited Bush at his ranch at the time, and details of what was discussed remained unknown, until now.

The memo was sent to Simon Mcdonalds, Principal Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Jonathan Powell, Blair's Chief of Staff, as well as other senior British officials.

According to the newly available secret memo, the Prime Minister and the US President met from April 5-7 and had multiple conversations in private. Manning details that on April 6, he and Jonathan Powell joined the former leaders for casual conversations.

Along with Bush came Condi Rice, Bush's former National Security Advisor, and Andy Card, Bush's Chief of Staff. Manning emphasized that the contents of the letter should not be shared and no copies made.

He entails that Bush and the British PM discussed Iraq on April 5, although the US central command had no plans for war, a small cell within US central command had been secretly established to study details of the military planning, with 99% of Centcom unaware.

Bush, according to the memo, was willing to meet with UK strategists to work through challenges and find strategies to win and had a desire to ensure regional stability would not be affected. Bush “did not much care” who would take Saddam Hussein's place when he was overthrown and acknowledged that PR had to be handled with extreme caution.

The former President plotted to put Saddam on the forefront of the UN inspection team, challenging his assertion that he was not developing WMD, being careful that timing to execute Saddam's overthrow would be crucial. "He would not want to launch any operation before the US Congressional elections in the autumn. Otherwise, he would be accused of warmongering for electoral benefit."

Blair emphasized the need for UN inspectors to be able to enter Iraq at any time and "be free to visit any place or installation."

Bush and Blair agreed to highlight Saddam's human rights record and the risks of his WMD program. Blair's strategy would be critical in controlling European public opinion and assisting Bush with an international alliance by depicting the "opportunity given to Saddam to cooperate," which would be used as a pretext if, as Manning expected, Saddam failed to do so.

Therefore, Saddam's refusal would have Europeans more at ease for toppling his regime and the "threat of WMD."

If the public demanded to know why the US wanted to act "now", the memo details how they would link the answer to 9/11 and the failure to take action until it is was late.

"It was also Bush’s view, though he would not be saying this publicly, that if a moderate secular regime succeeded Saddam in Iraq this would have a favorable impact on the region particularly on Saudi Arabia and Iraq."

Bush also expressed his desire to create a coalition for his Iraq policy, dismissing those on the American Right saying UN inspectors were not needed. George Bush senior told Blair that the US needed a coalition for Iraq "whatever right-wing kooks" might be saying.

Manning concludes the memo by saying that although Bush tentatively decided a campaign against Iraq would be best executed after November-February, the military planning "is not yet advanced very far," noting that only when planning is finalized would the options be discussed with Centcom.