'Israel's' new military doctrine: going on defense from sea to river? (illustration Al Mayadeen)

The Israeli understanding and implementation of deterrence have evolved significantly in the past few decades, as the entity engaged in diverse types of wars, mainly in the past three decades, when it was forced to reform its military practice away from classical concepts.

In a research paper published in 2012 titled "Deterrence beyond the State: The Israeli Experience," Thomas Rid, a Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, presented an elaborate explanation of "Israel's" deterrence concept when dealing with enemies.

Rid suggested that the entity's strategic foundation is instilling a sense of apprehension in adversaries regarding the prospect of conflict and asserting that the adversary will be met with accountability.

The primary objective of this approach is to effectively delay any future conflicts and simultaneously raise the threshold that justifies the breakout of any war.

As a result, according to the expert, this serves to curtail the potential methods and means the enemy may resort to if a conflict were to eventually unfold.

Providing further detail to this concept, Israeli Colonel Ron Tira (Res.), a former Air Force pilot with over 40 years of multifield experience, suggests in a study titled "Israel's Second War Doctrine," published by the Institute for National Security Studies INSS in 2016, that Israeli military campaigns consist of four crucial stages.

Initially, there should be a targeted strike using firepower against pre-identified target bank. This will be followed by a delay ensued until the decision was made to deploy ground forces to engage in combat. The third phase involved a generally limited ground offensive. Finally, the pressure was sustained until a ceasefire could be achieved, ensuring that both sides were ready to bring the conflict to an end.

According to Tira, the primary objective of the Israeli military was to inflict greater damage, both quantitatively and qualitatively, upon the enemy than what the entity endures within the same timeframe.

He argues that this strategic approach aimed to dissuade the opponent from finding any advantage in continuing the conflict. By doing so, "Israel" sought to compel the adversary to accept some of "Israel's" terms for a post-war arrangement, while also establishing a deterrence mechanism to delay any potential future conflicts.

Tira devised this method based on studying the course of six military campaigns launched by "Israel" between 1993 and 2014, which he considered contrary or inconsistent with the entity's official doctrine. The campaigns are, according to the Israeli designations: Operation Accountability (1993), Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996), the Second Lebanon War (2006), Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), and Operation Pillar of Defense (2012). and Operation Protective Edge (2014).

The reason that these military campaigns are inconsistent with the official doctrine lies in the fact that the occupation army is famous for a war doctrine based on a series of decisive and rapid operations, on the basis of sudden combined arms attacks. As an example, Rid recalled the "Six Days" war and the "Yom Kippur" war, when Israeli tanks broke, "world records in terms of the number of miles penetrated per day (depth of attack)," as he described.

In the six military campaigns, the entity focused on resource management and risk management, rather than risk and a potentially high cost.

As a result, "Israel" has prioritized balancing the costs and benefits by seeking a modest outcome at a modest cost and delaying the most weighty decisions as much as possible. This approach considered that the interests of the Israeli army are of secondary importance, simply because the enemy, according to the Israeli view, has not threatened to seize the "territories".

The issue is not related to analyzing the results of the 6 operations carried out by the Israeli occupation and its ability to achieve the goals it announced.

This is another discussion, especially since, specifically in July 2006, the most basic goal was to expel Hezbollah from areas south of the Litani River. These plans failed despite the entity launching a ground invasion.

In the 2014 aggression on Gaza, dubbed "Operation Protective Edge," the entity was unable to strike the core strengths of the Resistance, also despite launching a land campaign, and later failed to stop or prevent rocket launches on its settlements, all while employing its military machine to the fullest extent.

The matter to be discussed here then is the general consensus of the Israeli military doctrine, which they claim is adaptive to developments and changes, while in fact, the Israeli occupation was forced to introduce what they called "modifications" to the doctrine under the pretext of "adaptation" and resource management under the principle of "cost and returns".

The reason here is simple; the Israeli entity was unable to take decisive decisions and actions, nor it was able to achieve its goals.

Resistance doctrine amendments

Over the past decades, the Israeli military doctrine has been rooted in three basic principles: firstly, consistently transferring the battle to the enemy's territory, a doctrine established since Ben-Gurion. Secondly, trying to secure a swift victory within the first strike. Thirdly, conducting military campaigns with well-defined objectives, and allowing for doctrine adjustments as long as there's no imminent threat of the enemy seizing "Israeli territory."

For the purpose of fulfilling the doctrine's stated goals, the entity adopted a number of operational tactics as part of its action plan, that remain unchanged regardless of the opponents or their capabilities

Initiating Attacks: Proactively launching offensive actions.
Seeking Decisive Victories: Aiming for conclusive and impactful outcomes
Minimizing Losses: Striving to reduce casualties and resource depletion.
First Strike Initiative: Taking the initiative to strike first when necessary.
Preemptive Strikes: Employing preemptive measures to neutralize potential threats.
Blitzkrieg Tactics: Employing swift and intense actions to surprise and overwhelm the enemy.
Transferring Battles to Enemy Territory: Engaging the enemy in their own territory.

These tactics have become the cornerstone of the Israeli military doctrine, ensuring a focused and strategic approach to confronting various challenges and adversaries.

But despite declaring the action plan's items as the pillars of its war strategy, the occupation entity was forced to introduce dramatic changes to them during the six campaigns, most notably during the 2006 war on Lebanon when it was unable to deliver a decisive preliminary or preemptive strike, transfer the battle into enemy lands, but most importantly the failure to achieve any of its announced objectives.

Today, there is growing skepticism over the effectiveness of these attack principles, which are argued to have become obsolete in the current period.

As such, Tira voiced "doubts" regarding the sustainability of these operational patterns should "Israel" encounter adversaries possessing constantly evolving capabilities.

He explained that in the event that an adversary such as Hezbollah acquires new capabilities that could inflict more substantial damage to "Israel's" military, civil, and economic systems, it would necessitate a reevaluation of the feasibility of the entity's actions, based on the concept of accountability.

While Tira tried to mitigate the impact of the changes surrounding "Israel," by suggesting that they are just suspicions related to "the growing capabilities of Hezbollah," this does not negate the fact that the new reality is impacting the entity's combat doctrine, even more so than during the six campaigns.

Shocking new "doctrine"

The recent aggression on Jenin has further created a sense of urgent need to update the long-outdated military doctrine. While Israelis still consider, relatively, Jenin to be a "minor problem," for them it reflects a larger problem ahead.

Major General (Res.) Itzhak Brik, former Field Forces commander and chief of the Israeli Senior Colleges, called earlier this month for an immediate update on "Israel's" security doctrine, "which has not been updated since Ben-Gurion," who [Ben-Gurion] "talked about transferring the war to the enemy territory and maintaining calm on the home front, as much as possible."

But the real issues extend further than introducing changes to the doctrine.

Since these calls for modernization stem from real threats that “the next regional war will take place primarily on the home front,” they collide with several internal factors that prevent the political echelon from discussing them openly.

Publicly modifying the combat and security doctrine will be deemed as an indirect recognition by the entity of the dangers lying ahead, and this will impact multiple areas that affect the home front, "Israel's" crown jewel, even without an actual war.

Israeli settlers are deeply fixated on the notion of security, firmly believing in the capabilities of their military to decisively defeat the enemy. They hold the expectation that any potential conflict will remain distant from their own communities, will be rapid in nature, and incurred with minimal costs.

Recent developments have demonstrated that the previous status quo is no longer attainable, signaling a definitive shift from past realities.

Regarding the political class, the question that arises is: Who is brave enough to discuss the new reality and its implications which demand structural change to older understandings and concepts?

The intense focus on attaining and maintaining power at the political level, particularly over the past two decades, has led to heightened political tensions surrounding security matters and its association with the "combat doctrine."

As a result of this reality, those aspiring to attain power or those already in positions of power face several challenges when discussing the necessity of altering the "combat doctrine" to align with new threats and the conditions of future warfare.

Firstly, such discussions expose them to various criticisms. Secondly, it may jeopardize their influence. Thirdly, they may find themselves in conflict with the public they seek to win over, merely for broaching the topic of adapting the combat doctrine to address emerging threats and changing circumstances of potential conflicts.

Defend who

At the military level, the situation is different, as ground officers and those with combat experience have realized the inevitability of re-conceptualizing the original doctrine draft.

In the past few years, the army leadership implemented discreetly a range of changes to the doctrine, without public promotion or formal announcements.

These changes have been seamlessly integrated into the existing offensive operational handbook, through strategic documents and live exercises that simulate defensive scenarios, with a particular focus on the northern occupied Palestine region.

However, as the informal modernized doctrine is openly practiced but not officially documented or institutionalized, this led to ongoing tensions and disagreements between the Israeli military and the settlers, as the latter hold different expectations based on official documents - which upon observation it can be noticed that they do not align with formal doctrinal guidelines.

In August 2015, the Israeli military released its first official "defense" doctrine. The 33-page document was written by then Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot and outlines the military's strategies and actions against the main threats to the entity.

According to the US-based think tank The Washington Institute, the evolving strategic and operational environment has compelled the Israeli army to reevaluate the concept of deterrence and the two other longstanding pillars of military strategy; early warning, and military decision.

As a response to newly arising threats, which are represented by the growing power of regional Resistance, the entity was forced to introduce a new fourth pillar: "defense."

While offensive action remained a primary focus for military operations, a significant shift occurred by incorporating "defense" into two key aspects.

First, there was a continuous emphasis on developing a multi-layered active defense system against missiles and projectiles. Second, the focus was on preventing the enemy from taking control of "Israeli territories," even if it meant potentially evacuating settlers from those areas.

According to the think tank, this represents a notable departure from the traditional Israeli approach, signifying a substantial change in strategic thinking.

However, what is remarkable about this document is that when outlaying potential targets that should be "defended," the Israeli entity prioritizes decision-making and military facilities over its settlers.

When "Israel" confronts Hezbollah's massive missile arsenal, as an example cited by the institute, it will focus on first, preventing disruption of the war effort; second, the protection of important "national infrastructure"; Third, the protection of "civilian centers," which, according to Israeli estimates, will be exposed to thousands of missiles and projectiles on daily basis, and that is assuming that the war will only be with Hezbollah.

However, the revised doctrine did not receive the anticipated recognition.

According to The Jerusalem Post, Eizenkot's document "did not present anything new," rather it introduced amendments that were reported by the Meridor Committee (in 1986 and 2006), including the term “defense” with no clear definition of it.

Due to that aspect, the Israeli newspaper concluded that the doctrine has a "major problem".

"It does not reflect, in many parts, the government's position, beliefs, and practices," the outlet said, noting that the document focuses on the fact that "political directives are the basis for strategic thinking procedures in the General Staff."

The modifications remained circumstantial, relevant to a limited period of time, and are linked to the military leadership ruling at any given time.

As a result, the document was considered to not have fully developed into an official doctrine, and it did not alter or impact the nature of interim tactics in any significant way.

The hesitation is not only evident in the political leadership's reluctance to acknowledge the risks, but also in their fear of experimentation. They are hesitant to put proposed amendments into practical action, fearing that doing so might not yield the expected results to the public in the case of failure.

"The Doctrine of Victory"...a plan facing crucial questions

In recent years, maneuvers - in their "defensive" form - have become integral to the Israeli army's operations due to the emergence of new factors in the conflict landscape. These factors include the opponent's enhanced capacity to launch missiles and pose threats to the internal front, as well as their [opponents] ability to infiltrate forces inside occupied territories and transfer the battle into the center of the entity.

As a result, the Israeli military has adapted its strategies to counter these evolving challenges.

The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) touched upon the new war concepts and threats facing the entity.

In its study, JISS said, that since the 1980s, the Israeli army found itself fighting against organizations using guerrilla warfare, which represented an unprecedented security challenge to a military that has engaged since its formation in traditional conflicts.

According to the think tank, the emerging non-state actors carried out attacks targeting the Israeli internal front with high firepower, using precision missiles and rockets that have dramatically increased in range over the years. As a result, "Israel" found itself suffering from outdated operational concepts.

Outlining the framework of any new doctrine, JISS considered that a new robust strategy is required to address fundamental questions, including understanding the entity's security objectives, determining the military's warfare goals at the onset of an armed conflict, and defining the appropriate course of action to achieve these objectives effectively.

The institute added that the consequences of not having an updated security strategy and military doctrine were very clear. Although the Israeli army still possesses "fire superiority", the general outcome of confrontations that the Israeli military has engaged in has been disappointing time after time.

While arguing that Ben-Gurion's military doctrine significantly contributed to upgrading the military amid evolving threats, JISS suggested that the entity could modernize the Israeli war doctrine based on the "Victory Doctrine" put forward by the former Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi in 2020, which also included structural changes to the army general staff.

But it also warned of shortcomings, explaining that these efforts were not sufficient.

Kochavi's doctrine only takes into account the capabilities of the Israeli army more than it studies the capabilities of the enemy and what is expected of it.

Based on this, JISS stressed that the doctrine must be always subjected to questioning and doubt, pointing at the validity of the thought process behind it and the premises it was based on.

In its study, the institute concluded that Kochavi's "Victory doctrine" falls short of addressing 3 major threats in any upcoming war, presenting three vital requirements the entity needs to consider in order to achieve objectives - or avert defeat.

First: shortening the duration of the war. "Israel" cannot bear prolonged wars. It needs to mitigate harm to settlers and reduce their vulnerability to threats and economic paralysis. It is also important to avoid international pressure, which, as experience has shown, increases with the continuation of the fighting.

Second: enemies of "Israel" will take the course of action most dangerous to the entity. The underlying assumption must be that any capability the enemy develops will be used in the manner and timing that gives it an advantage and causes the greatest amount of harm to the entity. Any assumption that the enemy will not fully utilize its capabilities, or that it will implement its war plan in a way that suits "Israel", is baseless and dangerous in principle.

Third: preparing the army for war requires that plausible worst-case scenarios be taken into account. As derived from Rule 2; "Israel" does not and will not have the ability to anticipate the circumstances of the next war. Therefore, it should always prepare its plans assuming the worst-case scenario. Otherwise, at the moment of truth, the entity could find itself vulnerable.

According to the entity's estimates, the most dangerous event that might take place in any future war is the enemy's ability to conquer land within Israeli-occupied territories, shattering in the process the military's "defense doctrine".

In the same context, further concrete questions regarding the "Victory doctrine's" feasibility and effectiveness can be presented: How much does it anticipate a multi-front war?

Given the available data, it seems that the "Victory doctrine" is more about damage control than it is to defeat its opponents.

Defense is a binding doctrine

In the past few years, the regional Resistance axis has managed to exponentially increase its capabilities, power, and on-field experience - having been engaged in several wars in the region against Western-backed proxies and terrorist groups.

But the core threat today to the Israeli entity is not the Resistance's high-precision missiles and their range, them integrating air-defense systems, putting drones into operations, or the growing number of forces.

Today, what keeps the entity's military leadership without sleep - as per Israeli officials - is the concept of a multi-front war, which was the outcome of the Resistance's development of a unified command and control system across the Resistance factions and the high level of real-time coordination between the parties.

Recent Resistance operations, whether the launching of rockets from Golan, South of Lebanon and Gaza, or the steep rise of operations in the West Bank, left the entity unable to simultaneously deploy its capabilities on all fronts, due to the lack of manpower and air-defense systems.

Fears of over-stretching army units, the limited number of Iron Dome batteries, and battle management issues have left "Israel" in a dilemma: how many fronts can it fight on before its power becomes vulnerable on all fronts?

These challenges remain unaddressed to this day, indicating the entity's failure to develop a mature and updated doctrine that is able to deal with any kind of real present threats, leaving it in its most vulnerable state it has ever been.